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Reforming the Reform Process: Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe
Abstract
As communist regimes throughout Central and Eastern Europe have fallen one by one under the weight of
economic failure and popular discontent, the task of transforming these countries into stable and vibrant
liberal democratic societies has commanded the attention of many Western governments and
international organizations. Given the rapid and extremely destabilizing deterioration in the levels of
production and employment in each of the Newly Liberalizing Economies (NLCs), economic renewal has
become an urgent priority of the transformation process. Initially, the greatest importance was attached
to reforms involving stabilization and liberalization of prices, lowering of trade barriers, fiscal restraint,
and currency convertibility. Nevertheless, at a relatively early point in the reform enterprise, it became
strikingly apparent that extensive micro-economic reforms would also be necessary for the
transformation process to succeed. At the core of these micro-economic reforms stands privatization the policy aimed at "reducing the role of government, or increasing the role of the private sector, in an
activity or in the ownership of assets." However, unlike the relatively straight-forward adoption of many of
the measures aimed at macro-economic reform, the pace of privatization programs in the NLCs, as
measured by the amount of existing assets transferred from the state to the private sector, has been
extremely disappointing. In Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, for instance, there have been very few
large-scale privatizations, although recently there have been some impressive results obtained with
respect to small-scale privatization.
In attempting to identify the sources of delay in the process, Western commentators have attributed the
lion's share of responsibility to policy-makers in the NLCs. This line of attack implicitly assumes that the
programs devised by Western policy analysts (largely economists) are fundamentally sound, and that it is
only the lack of commitment to, or intellectual appreciation of, the rather unassailable case for radical
privatization policies that has impeded successful policy implementation. If this assessment is accurate,
then the possibilities for hastening the pace of privatization programs are extremely limited.
In this article, we advance a rather different explanation for the debilitating delays and uncertainty that
have plagued privatization in Central and Eastern Europe. Instead of focusing on implementation
difficulties, we argue that the source of the faltering pace of privatization in the NLCs lies within the basic
architecture of the programs themselves.
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REFORMING THE REFORM PROCESS: A
CRITIQUE OF PROPOSALS FOR
PRIVATIZATION IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE*
RONALD DANIELS**AND ROBERT HOWSE***

1.

INTRODUCTION

As communist regimes throughout Central and Eastern

Europe have fallen one by one under the weight of economic
failure and popular discontent, the task of transforming
these countries into stable and vibrant liberal democratic societies has commanded the attention of many Western governments and international organizations. Given the rapid
and extremely destabilizing deterioration in the levels of
production and employment in each of the Newly Liberalizing Economies (NLCs), economic renewal has become an urgent priority of the transformation process. Initially, the
greatest importance was attached to reforms involving stabilization and liberalization of prices, lowering of trade barriers, fiscal restraint, and currency convertibility. Nevertheless, at a relatively early point in the reform enterprise, it became strikingly apparent that extensive micro-economic
reforms would also be necessary for the transformation pro-

* This article is based on a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of
the Canadian Law and Economics Association, Faculty of Law, Universit)'
of Toronto, September 1991. It is current as of its date of acceptance in
Spring 1992. The authors are grateful for comments and suggestions
from participants in the conference. We have benefitted greatly from
conversations with members of the Law Faculties of the Unh'ersit)' of
Budapest and the Charles University, Prague, as well as with Michael
Trebilcock and Manuel Hinds. We are also grateful for the research
assistance of Brian Osler and Ely Razin, and library assistance of Debra
Forman, the International Business and Trade Law Librarian at the
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
** Associate Professor of Law and Director, International Business
and Trade Law Programme, Faculty of Law, Universit)' of Toronto.
*** Assistant Professor of Law and Assistant Director, Intcrnational
Business and Trade Law Programme, Faculty of Law, Unh'crsit)' of Toronto.
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cess to succeed. I At the core of these micro-economic reforms stands privatization-the policy aimed at "reducing
the role of government, or increasing the role of the private
sector, in an activity or in the ownership of assets."2 However, unlike the relatively straight-forward adoption of many
of the measures aimed at macro-economic reform, the pace
of privatization programs in the NLCs, as measured by the
amount of existing assets transferred from the state to the
private sector, has been extremely disappointing. In Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, for instance, there have
been very few large-scale privatizations, although recently
there have been some impressive results obtained with respect to small-scale privatization. 3
In attempting to identify the sources of delay in the process, Western commentators have attributed the lion's share
of responsibility to policy-makers in the NLCs. This line of
attack implicitly assumes that the programs devised by Western policy analysts (largely economists) are fundamentally
sound, and that it is only the lack of commitment to, or intellectual appreciation of, the rather unassailable case for radical privatization policies that has impeded successful policy
implementation. If this assessment is accurate, then the possibilities for hastening the pace of privatization programs are
extremely limited.
In this article, we advance a rather different explanation
for the debilitating delays and uncertainty that have plagued
privatization in Central and Eastern Europe. Instead of focusing on implementation difficulties, we argue that the
source of the faltering pace of privatization in the NLCs lies
within the basic architecture of the programs themselves.
1. See MANUEL HINDS, Issues in the Introduction of Market Forces in Eastem
European Socialist Economies 19-30 (World Bank Internal Discussion Paper

Report No. IDP-0057, 1990).
2. EMANUEL S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT 3 (1987).
3. In Poland, for instance, by the end ofJune 1991, only 13 out of a
total of more than 7000 state enterprises had been sold. Steve Lohr, Poland to Privatize Industry by Giving Stakes to All Adults, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
1991, at AI. However, small-scale privatization of shops and services has
been significantly more successful. As of February 1992, 70% of retail
outlets in Poland were privately owned. The Business Outlook: Poland, Bus.
E. EUR., Feb. 10, 1992, at 64.
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Specifically, we believe, 'with some notable exceptions, that
most of the large-scale privatization plans are beset by severe
conceptual confusion going to the very purpose of the privatization enterprise.
This confusion reflects, to a large extent, the loading of
privatization plans with numerous and often conflicting
goals. Contrary to the initial intent of many Western advisers, the privatization programs devised for the NLCs. have
strayed well beyond the preserve of efficiency to include such
conflicting goals as government wealth creation, dissipation
of concentrated political power, and compensatory justice.
Recognition of the existence of multiple goals in the privatization enterprise leads directly to the question of which instruments are best suited to the realization of these goals.
One way to rectify the haphazard progress of privatization in
the NLCs is to "unbundle" policy by remitting certain privatization goals to other, more finely honed, public policy instruments.
Although determining how privatization policy became
loaded with so many diverse and irreconcilable objectives in
the first place, is an exercise fraught with considerable complexity we speculate that at least part of the reason for its
peculiar evolution emanates from an insensitivity to the interaction between economic and non-economic values that
has become enshrined in privatization policy. This insensitivity, in turn, reflects a fundamental misreading of the
meaning of the revolutions that marked the end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe. In much of the academic and popular writing on privatization in the NLCs,
there is an assumption that popUlar revolutions throughout
Central and Eastern Europe have marked an unalloyed triumph for free markets and weak states, as defined according
to classical conceptions of liberal capitalism." Nevertheless,
we argue that it was the notion of a more humane and workable version of the modern liberal welfare state, as found
throughout Western Europe and North America, that really
inspired change in Central and Eastern Europe. The liberal
welfare state's attractiveness to citizens in Central and Eastern Europe is understood when one considers its proven
4. See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, The E1/d of Hislol)'? 88 NAT'L INTEREST

345 (1989).
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ability to achieve the economic goals of socialism (working
class prosperity, high levels of employment, relative economic stability, and social security) under conditions offreedom and democracy.5 It is among the greatest ironies of intellectual history that the attack on laissez-faire by the Western left laid the ideological ground for the modern social
welfare state, which minimized the allure of communism in
the West and provided an attractive alternative model to the
East. This modern social welfare state proved that capitalism
need not be as harsh and unstable as Marx had imagined.
Inordinate focus on planning the removal of the state
from direct economic activity has had important ramifications for policy development. It has diverted attention from
the task of crafting new effective policy levers and institutional arrangements whereby the state can manage the economy, forge legitimate deals between social and economic interest groups, and adequately control the instability and resurgence of societal cleavages. Even if it were possible,
massive privatization without the prior or simultaneous creation of strong and legitimate public institutions and new social contracts would be decidedly dangerous for political and
social stability. Indeed, much of the hesitancy towards moving more rapidly with privatization-oriented reforms, which
Western observers tend to interpret as a wavering allegiance
to markets or a misunderstanding of them, stems from such
concerns. Instead of reacting with disappointment to, or
alarm at, the slow pace of privatization in Central and Eastern Europe, Western advisers should focus more attention
on the strengthening of public institutions and the creation
of appropriate levers of economic management.
II.

THE OBJECTIVES OF PRIVATIZATION

Close inspection of the privatization programs adopted
in Central and Eastern Europe reveals the presence of multiple policy goals. Although varying in the degree of emphasis
given different objectives, most privatization programs in the
NLCs have pursued some, if not all, of the following goals:
(i) wealth maximization; (ii) enhancment of government rev5. See RALF DAHRENDORF, REFLECTIONS OF THE REVOLUTION IN EUItOPE
(1990). See also Claus Offe, Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic TheoT)'
Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe, 58 Soc. RES. 865 (1991).
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enue; (iii) decentralization and fragmentation of political
power; and (iv) vindication of compensatory justice concerns. In this section, we consider the nature of the privatization program that exclusively pursues each of these
goals. This exercise reveals in rather stark terms the depth
of the conflicts that are created when all of these goals are
compressed into a single program. Despite the premium we
place on policy unbundling, i.e. remitting different goals to
different instruments, we do find that some goals can be accommodated within the same privatization program, and we
suggest ways in which the friction created by simultaneous
pursuit of these goals can be reduced.
A.

Global Wealth Maximization

As discussed above, policy analysts most frequently invoke the goal of global wealth maximization (or efficiency) in
the design and implementation of privatization programs in
the NLCs. The efficiency case for privatization hinges upon
assumptions about differences in the incentives that weigh
upon private, as opposed to public, actors with respect to the
management of enterprises. If one begins from the proposition that under conditions of perfect competition, and absent other market imperfections, self-interested market exchanges will result in allocation of scarce productive resources to highest valued uses, ownership of the means of
production by economically self-interested actors seems a
logical means of achieving the maximization of aggregate
economic wealth. This is the essence of Smith's invisible
hand. 6
This insight does not depend on a simplistic identification of aggregate economic wealth with optimum social welfare. Rather, the assumption is that these are separable,
well-defined concepts, and where these two diverge the appropriate response is not direct public management of production, but various forms of regulation and taxation that influence or constrain the decisions of private managers, who
remain motivated entirely by profit maximization.7 This assumption is not uncontroversial, however, as evidenced by
in

6. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (1937). See discussion
CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBUC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 6 (1977).
7. JOHN VICKERS & GEORGE YARROW, PRIVATIZATION: AN ECONO~IIC
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the vigorous debate in North American corporate law theory
as to whether the background legal rules and basic expectations with respect to managerial behavior should reflect a
general notion of broader social responsibility, permitting or
even encouraging managerial decisions that diverge from the
requirements of profit-maximization. 8
In theory, of course, even though government has a
much wider variety of goals to achieve than wealth maximization, it could run an enterprise with a view to this goal alone.
Indeed, Laux and Molot have suggested that in a number of
Western countries there has been a move towards instructing public managers to run enterprises on a profitmaximization basis. 9 In practice, however, governments are
accountable to diverse public constituencies for the decisions
they make in the management of public enterprises, and the
goals and interests of many of the most powerful of these
constituencies may be at variance with the demands of profitmaximization. As a consequence, governments are often
forced to back away from an unqualified commitment to
profit-maximization in the delivery of public goods.
The problems for governments in containing demands
of special interest groups in favor of an unadorned profitmaximization calculus are illustrated, in particularly dramatic
terms, by some of the failed experiments in enterprise-management that were aimed at restoring some semblance of
profit motivation in Central and Eastern Europe. As Hinds
has observed, the flirtation of communist governments in
Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia with these schemes inevitably ended up with managers and employees conspiring to
increase their wages and job security by going on extensive
inter-firm borrowing binges and by foregoing needed investment in obsolete plants and equipment. 1O Of course, these
problems are not confined to the East. Governments in the
ANALYSIS 79-81 (1988). See also Robert Howse, et aI., Smaller or Smarter
Government?, 40 U. TORONTO LJ. 498 (1990).
8. See Ronald J. Daniels, Mergers and Aquisitions and the Public Interest:
Don't Shoot the J\1essenger, in CORPORATE GLOBALIZATION THROUGH MERGERS
AND ACQ.UISITIONS 195, 223-27 (Leonard Waverman ed., 1991).
9. JEANNE K. LAux & MAUREEN A. MOLOT, STATE CAPITALISM: PUBLIC
ENTERPRISE IN CANADA 27 (1988).
10. HINDS, supra note I, at 10-43. These problems are not, of course,
confined to the East.
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West often yield to the demands for protectionism by public
sector management and labor groups despite the dire efficiency consequences and questionable non-efficiency rationales for policies that resist rather than ease the adjustment
to change. II
Even if it is assumed that government officials have a desire to deliver goods and services in a way that is disciplined
by profit-maximization objectives, and, further, that they are
able to keep special interest groups at bay, a strong presumption operates that the capacity of public management to
effectively vindicate these goals will, for the most part, be deficient in relation to the private sector. This comparative disadvantage emanates mainly from the distorted incentives for
efficient risk-taking that are pervasive within the bureaucracy. Whereas private entrepreneurs (in a setting characterized by trivial agency costs of equity) will bear the full
residual financial consequences of a given project (either
losses or profits), 12 public officials responsible for hiring and
firing managers of public enterprises, and for giving them
broad policy guidance, have only an indirect stake in the success or failure of the enterprises in question. While it is possible that internal promotions or demotions may make bureaucrat welfare somewhat sensitive to the relative success or
failure of a proposed project, such settling-up mechanisms
only partially capture the intensity of penalties and rewards
that private sector owners will face from the same investment
project.
The fact that public officials face a different set of penalties and rewards will, not surprisingly, exert an important
impact on the nature of their decision-making. Under the
positive net present value rule used to evaluate investment
decisions in the private sector, projects are selected on the
basis of the magnitude of their relative economic value. IS
The larger the positive difference between the benefits of a

J.

11. See MICHAEL
TREBILCOCK £T AL., TRADE AND TRANS mONS:
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ADJUSTMENT POUCIES. chs. 1,6 (1990).

A

12. Of course, limited liability and bankruptcy law pro\'ide a legal
framework for sharing or mitigating the risks of financial loss inherent in
any business venture, as do labor laws that allow relatively rapid and inexpensive dismissal of workers.
13. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE, ch. 2 (2d ed. 1984).
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given project (as measured by the sum of the range of possible expected future financial outcomes) and the costs (as
measured by market parameters), the more attractive the
project is for selection. Most importantly, the rule bars the
selection of projects characterized by negative net present
values. Within the public sector, the positive net present
value rule, and the principles of risk and return that undergird it, will have less force. As a consequence, public sector
decision-makers can be expected to allocate and utilize resources less efficiently than in the private sector.
Finally, public sector decision-making may be less conducive to the efficient allocation of production factors due to
the dearth of effective external constraints on public sector
conduct. Whereas the resource allocation decisions in the
private sector are subject to searching and unrelenting external review by a wide range of markets, including the capital,I4 product, labor, and, in some cases, takeover markets,
public sector decisions are constrained by a much weaker
and more episodic system of scrutiny involving specialized
agencies (e.g., the auditor general), as well as infrequent voting by citizens in elections. I5 Divergences in both the intensity and duration of project review mean that public sector
decisions are prone to more serious errors at the project valuation stage. Without the discipline of the marketplace,
public sector decision-makers will have less robust data upon
which to make decisions. It is also likely that these problems
will continue well past the formation stage of public programs as decision-makers become wedded to non-market initiatives. These problems are particularly severe when, as in
the case of the NLCs, the scope for market review has been
completely usurped by the state, depriving markets of any
checking role. I6 Moreover, even where public officials do at14. Clearly, however, major state-owned enterprises in Western countries (e.g., Renault in France) are subject to scrutiny by market analysts, if
only because they have private sector competitors. By contrast, the problem is most severe where the public enterprise is also a monopoly, as is the
case for much of Eastern Europe.
15. Some public enterprises raise funds in the private debt capital markets, which has the effect of subjecting their decisions to external scrutiny
imposed by lenders in those markets.
16. This argument should not be construed as a claim that private managers never blunder, but rather when they do, market mechanisms are
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tempt to hire and fire managers on the basis of their capacity
to maximize profits, the absence of a functioning market for
managers and the lack of good information about their relative profit-maximizing capabilities make this exercise highly
problematic in the Central and East European context.
The efficiency claim in favor of private markets should
not, however, be taken to mean that this mode of allocation
'will always produce wealth maximizing outcomes. Commencing with Berle and Means,17 numerous American scholars belonging to the "managerialist school" have cast doubt
on the willingness of managers to subordinate their own interests to the overriding goal of shareholder profit-maximization. This sentiment is evidenced by the underlying
vigor of market mechanisms. Although law and economics
scholars have refined many of the managerialist claims by insisting that claims of managerial opportunism be grounded
in some evidence of external market or internal governance
failure, the fact remains that even these scholars would agree
that private managers may deviate from an unwavering commitment to profit-maximization. 18 Hence, before concluding
that the private sector is better able to vindicate efficiency
goals across all contexts, it is necessary to compare the magnitude of the wealth losses from internal agency costs occasioned by private and public delivery. Generally, however,
where objectives can be precisely specified and conduct
designed to achieve those objectives can be easily monitored, private production will be superior to public produc-

more effective in meting out appropriate penalties by either barring further recourse to capital, or, in extreme, by reallocating assets through
bankruptcy proceedings. Of course, in theory, governments could let
non-viable public enterprises fail in this manner. In practice, however,
political pressure ensures that they almost never do.
17. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, TUE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERlY (rev. ed., Harcourt, Brace & World 1968)
(1932).
18. Indeed, the convergence between these two bodies of scholarship
is underscored by the legal economist's focus on controlling costs occasioned by shirking and perquisite consumption. For a re\·iew of the relationship between managerialist and law and economics scholarship, sec
J.S. ZIEGEL ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PARTNERSlUPS AND CANADIAN
BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 367-80 (2d ed. 1989).
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tion. I9
Given the advantages of private sector organization in
effectuating wealth maximizing conduct, what are the implications for privatization initiatives in the NLCs? It is an essential starting point for the creation of an environment conducive to wealth maximization that productive resources be
capable of allocation through voluntary exchange. Therefore, resources must take the form of property that can be
alienated. Under the old regime, lawful possession of assets
was based upon administrative order or fiat. Although there
has been considerable inter-enterprise "trade," especially after the first wave of decentralizing reforms in most of the
Central and Eastern European countries,20 it has been based
upon detailed administrative guidelines and practices. Additionally, even though enterprises, and their workers and
managers, had various legally prescribed rights, duties, and
privileges, no one actually had a proprietary claim on the assets of the enterprises-not even the state. 21 The move towards greater management control of state assets engendered by the decentralizing reforms has created one of the
great ironies of the current privatization process. In order
for the state to effectively privatize these assets through divestiture, the state must first centralize its control over them.
Proprietization does not, of itself, imply privatization,
and indeed its first stage has generally been the establishment of industrial assets as property of the state. 22 However,
this form of proprietization has not been without its controversial dimensions. Workers and managers have often
claimed that rights to manage and share in the revenues of
enterprises that were granted under socialist economic reform have the character of quasi-proprietary entitlements,
and hence that proprietization by the state is a kind of taking.
19. JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS,
PRIVATE MEANS, chs. 3-5 (1989).
20. The first wave of decentralizing reforms in Central and Eastern Europe took place from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. Judy Batt, The Em/

of Communist Rule in East-Centra/ Europe: A Four-Country Comparison, 26
GOv'T & OPPOSITION 368 (1991).
21. As HINDS, supra note I, at 21, has stated: "In effect, having socialist
enterprises owning themselves means that nobody owns them."
22. David Lipton &Jeffrey Sachs, Privatization in Eastem Europe: The Case
of Poland, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIyITY 293, 299-313 (1990).
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This provides some degree ofjustification, perhaps, for the
propensity of workers and managers to "spontaneously
privatize" property in the first stages of the post-revolutionary period. 23
Does privatization guided by wealth creation require
that the state be the recipient of newly created property
rights? Wealth creation does not require that the state be
the first, albeit interim, owner of newly created property.
However, there are sound reasons for supporting this role.
First, the state would appear to be more sensitive than those
individuals involved in spontaneous privatizations to the
need for preservation of the "going concern" value of enterprises. 24 Second, the attractiveness of the state as initial interim owner is buttressed by the fact that it is the institution
best situated to determine the appropriate scope ofprivatization of state assets. Third, recognizing that the state must
retain at least some assets so that it is able to fulfill its end of
the bargain under the social contract, it seems appropriate
that the state initially retain ownership and then dispose of
its inventory of assets as the extent of its obligation and the
degree of property necessary to fulfill this obligation become
more clear. A final reason for interim state ownership emanates from the necessity of state action in readying assets for
transfer to the private sector by, among other things, negating debt obligations that were incurred by enterprises during
predecessor communist regimes. Because these obligations
were incurred in a setting where capital budgeting decisions
were largely impervious to consumer demand, there may not
be any continuing economic rationale for these obligations
to be enforced in a market context.25 It should be noted that
interim state ownership could be combined with manage23. These privatizations involved hastily concluded alliances between
the 7UJmenklatura and other stakeholders (e.g., worker councils and foreign
investors) that enabled the privatizers to make quick profits on the sales of
assets of state run factories. For a discussion of spontaneous prh'atization.
see JANOS KORNAI. THE ROAD TO A FREE ECONOMY: SHIFTING FROM It. 50CIAUST SYSTEM: THE ExAMPLE OF HUNGARY 80-93 (1990). See also Ill.
24. In particular, in the carnival environment of rapid asset sales. the
prospects of promoters squandering scarce going concern value in an effort to obtain quick profits are enhanced.
25. See OUVIER J. BLANCHARD ET AL.• REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE 49
(1991). HINDS. supra note 1, at 74-78. also argues for negation of outstanding loan obligations prior to privatization. but only to the degree
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ment contracts, where private managers or consulting firms
oversee the day-to-day running of enterprises in the interim
period. 26 Perhaps a central reason why this course of action
has not been recommended or taken in most cases is the expectation that privatization itself can be achieved very rapidly. Accepting that this expectation is unrealistic (as argued
in this article) would perhaps have the salutary effect of
drawing more attention to the issues surrounding interim
oversight of state enterprises. The quality of such interim
oversight may well be decisive in preventing the stripping of
assets or other "end game" behavior by workers and management, and more generally, in preserving or enhancing
the ultimate value of the assets to be sold into private hands.
In considering how newly minted property entitlements
should be distributed, or indeed, who should be the ultimate
recipient of these entitlements, a privatization scheme based
on wealth maximization requires only that entitlements be
distributed in a way which maximizes the likelihood that the
property will gravitate to the highest valued user. This
means that an efficiency motivated privatization scheme
would not concern itself with the fact that undesirable entities, such as foreign investors, former members of the nomenklatura, or black marketeers were the most efficient users of
the property. In other words, to deny highest valued users
distributed property requires the invocation of norms that
are based on considerations quite distinct from efficiency.
Following Coase, another important consideration to
bear in mind when considering the initial distribution of
property rights is the efficiency of secondary trading marketsP The greater the confidence of planners in the capacity of markets to re-allocate property received under the initial allocation-at relatively low cost-the less the importance of whether or not the initial recipient is, from an
efficiency perspective, the highest valued user. 28 Simply put,
necessary to induce new owners to make long-term investments in the enterprise.
26. SVEN O. HEGSTAD & IAN NEWPORT, Management Contracts: Alain Features and Design Issues (World Bank Technical Paper No. 65, 1987).
27. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, Sl.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
28. Given, however, the fact that the initial recipient of the property
will receive some consideration for the property when it is traded in the
secondary market, the issue of initial distribution becomes very important
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the question is whether the transaction and administrative
costs in designing a privatization scheme to maximize the efficiency of an initial allocation are higher or lower than those
entailed in subsequent reallocation to higher valued uses.
Since changing market conditions, domestic and international, will make even the most perfect initial allocation unsatisfactory after a period of time, there is a strong argument-given the scarce resources available to the policy reform process-for concentrating on the development oflowtransaction-cost mechanisms for market re-allocation. The
focus of the initial allocation decision then becomes the various non-efficiency goals, such as compensatory justice.
Predictably, the decision as to which route to follow in
efficiency-inspired privatizations depends on a complex and
highly country-specific cost-benefit analysis. Included in the
calculus of choice are such factors as: (i) the political and
ethical import of the non-efficiency objectives to be vindicated in the initial distribution; (ii) the possibilities of disentangling the realization of these goals from the distribution
of in species property; (iii) the comparative administrative
costs of each regime; and (iv) the time required for each regime to be implemented, bearing in mind Lipton's and
Sachs's concern with the potential for privatization delays to
subvert the entire reform effort. 29
Although the choice between these two approaches is
one that must ultimately be remitted to the political realm,
thereby underscoring the salience of our earlier claim in
favor of strong, legitimate states, we offer some general
thoughts on the design issues necessary to implement either
approach. If governments opt for a regime in which effifrom a distributional perspective, especially when the property is initially
distributed for free.
29. David Lipton &]effrey Sachs, Creating a .\larket £Conom)' m Eastml
Europe: The Case ofPoland, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACT1\'m' 75 (1990).
Both the economic logic and the political situation argue for a
rapid and comprehensive process of transition.... [Plrobabl)' the
greatest political risk facing Eastern Europe is not a resurgence of
communism, but the Argentine trap of political and social paral)·.
sis, in which coalitions of workers, managers, and bureaucrats in
the declining sectors succeed in frustrating the needed adjustments.
Id. at 99-100.
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ciency is to be promoted at the secondary trading stage, then
there is some urgency that stable, adequate rules for market
reallocation be implemented. Following the logic of Coasian
analysis, these rules should, as far as possible, lead to the
types of agreements that would be arrived at by fully informed parties in a setting of zero transaction costs. Additionally, from a political perspective, it is highly desirable to
create market game rules before engaging in the privatization of large enterprises. The process of writing the rules is
likely to be less difficult prior to the growth of powerful private interests having highly specific ideas as to how the rules
ought to be written. In addition, to the extent that the rules
for the market are clear at the outset, one aspect of uncertainty (which creates its own transaction costs) is alleviated.
On the other hand, if a regime in which efficiency concerns are vindicated at the initial stage of distribution is preferred, then there are strong arguments for relying on auctions as a distributional mechanism. There are at least two
principal arguments in favor of auctions. so First, assuming
an open bidding process with multiple, non-collusive bidders, auctions increase the possibility that bidders will reveal
their true valuations, thereby enabling the auctioneer to allocate the asset to the bidder who values it the most. Second,
the auction process creates powerful incentives for bidders
to seek and obtain information about the assets up for sale
and their possible uses in a future market economy. This information is extremely useful in a setting where the true
value of the assets being auctioned is not even known to the
state as auctioneer. SI The information thus generated is extremely useful in determining the value and prospects for future viability of the assets that are to be distributed.
Despite the fact that many of the privatization programs
proposed for the NLCs are advocated based on their efficiency-promoting qualities, we are not at all confident that
the auctions envisaged by the privatization programs will
30. For a discussion on the instrumental value of auctions, see CHARLES
W. SMITH, AUCTIONS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VALUE 80-107
(1989).
31. Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski, Evolution and Design in
the East European Transition (199 I) (draft paper presented at the 1991
Canadian Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, on file with
authors).
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yield the expected benefits. 32 To begin with, because of the
undeveloped state of capital markets in the NLCs, a winning
bid will, more often than not, be determined on the basis of
the bidder's own ability to pay rather than on the basis of
willingness to pay as efficiency requires. Without adequate
sources of credit, high-valued but cash-strapped bidders will
be precluded from participating in the auction process, leaving open the possibility that assets will wind up in the hands
of wealthier but less efficient bidders. In an efficiently functioning market, of course, the capacity to pay will often depend significandy on previous success in entrepreneurship,
and thus may have some value as a prediction of future entrepreneurial success. However, in the NLCs, many of those
who have accumulated considerable wealth have done so as a
consequence of special privileges of various sorts or by effectively playing by the rules of a non-market game.33 This discrimination in favor of financially solvent bidders heightens
the importance of finding a way to open up the process to
bidders with the highest willingness to pay. One solution
would be to use the proceeds of an initial series of auctions
as the seed capital for loans provided by private banks to talented but capital deficient entrepreneurs. Alternatively, the
state itself could provide credit for the purchase of the enterprises.34
Further compounding the difficulties of the auction re32. An alternative but far less desirable way of dealing with the prior
endowments problem would be to eschew auctions altogether b)' having
the state or a state-appointed agency invite individuals to apply for the
property and then allow the agency to undertake an investigation aimed at
determining who placed the greatest value on the property. Howe\'er,
even if it were possible to ascertain, through such a metaph)'sical search.
the identity of that individual whose preference function placed the highest value on a given asset, its malleability would likel)' be corrupted b)'
nepotism and graft. For these reasons, a superior alternative would be to
involve international institutions such as the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in both the funding and
evaluation of competing bids for state assets.
33. Nevertheless, in order to translate these privileges into significant
wealth accumulation, the individuals in question would find it necessary to
also be successful to some degree in gray and black market acthity.
Notwithstanding the moral issues involved, one should not underestimate
the extent to which experience with gray and black market acth'ity builds
genuine entrepreneurial skills.
34. See Lipton & Sachs, supra note 29, at 21.
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gime in existing privatization programs is the frequency with
which governments have insisted upon and subsequently exercised a right ofreserve. 35 Presumably, the rationale for the
reserve right is grounded in the concern that bidders will be
able to purchase assets at prices below their intrinsic value.
Nevertheless, given the gross uncertainties that plague the
asset valuation process, it is not at all clear why the subjective valuation of a bureaucrat should be allowed to trump the
collective judgment of the market, however primitive that
judgment may be.
However, if there are grounds for believing that infirmities in the auction process have caused bidders to underprice
assets, then the obvious solution is to provide direct remedies for these defects. For example, a bid that appears too
low may implicate an inadequate dissemination to alternative
potential bidders of information bearing on the availability
and possible underlying value of the assets. Here the appropriate response would be to reform bidding procedures so as
to encourage a wider range of bids, and to ensure that particular bidders do not have or appear to have an "inside edge,"
thereby discouraging alternative bidders. Governments
must recognize that the quality and range of bids depends
directly upon the incentive for potential bidders to invest the
time and money necessary to locate the information required
to establish an appropriate bidding price. The regular exercise by governments of their right to refuse the highest or
sole bid by removing the assets from sale creates considerable uncertainty for potential bidders as to whether it is
worthwhile to enter a bid at all.
Another way in which existing privatization programs
deviate from idealized auction regimes is in the extensive reliance that some governmental privatization agencies have
placed on pre-privatization analyses of industrial organization structure. 36 Typically, these programs contain a heavy
element of industrial planning that is reminiscent of the ex35. See Francis Gabor, Privatization in Hungary: Valuation Issues Lead 10
Creation of Stale Property Agency, I PARKER SCH. BULL. SOVIET & E. EUR. L.,
May 1990, at 2; Shirley J. Goldstein, Russian Privatizalion: Rough Sailing
Ahead, 2 PARKER SCH. BULL. SOVIET & E. EUR. L., Oct. 1991, at 9; and Mark
A. Meyer, Romanians Enact Their Privalization Law, 2 PARKER Scn. BULL. SoVIET & E. EUR. L., Sept. 1991, at 3.
36. See Gabor, supra note 35, at 2; Goldstein, supra note 35, at 9; and
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tensive role played by the state and various enterprise
groups in predecessor regimes. These programs substantially delay the process of privatization. They also risk enshrining producer interests in the post-privatization regime
or substituting public planning for private decision-making,
which gready increases the risk of sub-optimal resource use.
While ex ante state planning is aimed at creating a sufficiendy
competitive products market in a given industry, a better way
of achieving this goal would be to establish an antitrust regime applicable to privatized enterprises.S7
In late 1991, the Hungarian government made a promising departure from the "industrial planning" approach to
the privatization scheme.s8 New legislation allows the
method of privatization of a select group of about three hundred small- to medium-sized state enterprises to be determined by independent (mainly Western) management consultants. 39 Managers of these enterprises may, on their own
initiative, decide to proceed with privatization. In that situation, one of the authorized management consultants is responsible for deciding how the firm is to be privatized,
choosing a buyer, and so forth, subject to a general requirement that there be open competition for ownership of the
firm. The consultant's compensation is five percent of the
sale price, or ten percent in the case of a rapid sale.40 This
incentive structure clearly veers toward a revenue-maximization approach to privatization. However, the higher commission in the case of a rapid sale provides a disincentive for a
consultant to hold out for a long period of time in order to
obtain the "best price," thereby potentially undermining aggregate wealth-maximization goals. Unfortunately, these
provisions apply to only fifteen percent of the firms that are
Igor
VIET

Kavass, Nature and Problems of Privatizatioll. 3

PARKER

Sen. BuLL. So-

& E. EUR. L., Nov. 1992, at 8.

37. See Michael Trebilcock. The Role of Competition Polic}' in NonMarket Economies in Transition: The Case of Hungary auly 10. 1991)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). Trebilcock hopes that
an advocate of this position would argue "strenuously. both publicly and
privately, the virtues of policies relating to privatization, deregulation. foreign investment and trade policy liberalization." Id. at 12.
38. See R. Szakal, Self-Privatizatioll. INVEST IN HUNCARY: LECISUTION
SUPPLEMENT, Nov. 1991, at 63.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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to be privatized, which in turn represents only about five percent of the total assets that the Hungarian government intends to privatize.41
Another unfortunate feature of auction-based privatization schemes in the NLCs is the insistence that successful
purchasers of auctioned property agree to comply with conditions relating to the maintenance of the existing enterprise
structure which include prohibitions on the liquidation or
transfer of assets and maintaining employment goals. These
restrictions impede the desired reallocation of resources
based on new information about the best uses for the resources under market conditions. 42 Furthermore, buyers
face increased risk because they will be required to make
fixed commitments under conditions of profound uncertainty as to the revenues likely to be generated from the enterprises under market conditions.
This is not to suggest that privatization should take
place without appropriate social security and other protections for workers. Rather, as will be argued below, such protections should be a separate but simultaneous track to the
design of the privatization process, and should be achieved
through taxes and transfers. Finally, limitations on the sale
of state enterprises to foreign buyers are undesirable from a
wealth maximization perspective (although they may possibly be defended under a national sovereignty perspective),
since they reduce the range of bidders willing and able to
generate information on the value of assets through the auctioning process. However, the political realities of Eastern
and Central Europe-particularly the emergence of nationalist sentiments after fifty years of domination-have severely
limited the political viability of direct asset sales to foreign
investors.
B. Maximization of State Revenue

Another central goal of privatization is the maximization
of governmental revenue from the sale of enterprises. By
41. !d.
42. HINDS, supra note I, at 45, explains that factor mobility is crucial in
establishing a market that reacts properly to market signals, and that if
such mobility is to exist it is crucial that a substantial portion of state industries be rapidly privatized.

HeinOnline -- 25 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 44 1992-1993

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.u. Journal of Internationl Law and Politics

1992]

REFORMING THE REFORM PROCESS

45

selling off state owned properties, governments are able to
substitute a cash payment or a receivable of a fixed amount
for an in species asset of uncertain value. Assuming that auction markets are working effectively, the value of this fixed
payment is equal to the net present value of future net cash
flows. The proceeds from the sale of assets can be used by
governments to increase the range and level of goods and
services that they are expected to provide.
The need for governments to generate revenue has
been a driving force for many privatization initiatives in
Western and developing countries. Although originally embraced as a central component of privatization in the NLCs,
government revenue creation is losing much of its lustre because of growing investor anxiety over the quality of the assets being distributed, the prospects of rehabilitation, and
the socio-Iegal risks that affect the future value of these assets.43 Quite simply, in an environment characterized by
capital scarcity, investors have been able to find more than
enough high return, high risk investments without having to
bear many of the additional risks inherent to investments in
the NLCs.
Additionally, investors may prefer to establish new private firms or to export goods into the NLCs (effectively
abandoning entry by way of the firm), rather than risk being
burdened with the adjustment, environmental regulations,
and other restrictions on existing state enterprises. Now that
a relationship with an existing state enterprise is no longer a
legal or practical requirement for conducting economic activity in the NLCs, it is not surprising that some of the interest in acquiring these assets has waned.
Nevertheless, governments in the NLCs continue to
cling to the erroneous assumption that privatization can furnish valuable rents for the government, reluctantly acknowledging only that the timing for privatization may not be
right.
Similar to a privatization scheme guided by global
wealth maximization goals, privatization implemented to
achieve government wealth creation requires interim government ownership coupled with extensive auctions. Such a
43. For a discussion of many of these issues. see Busi7less 111 EOJlml Europe: Survey, ECONOMIST, Sept. 21. 1991. at 14-18.
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privatization scheme should also involve the establishment
of clear and unequivocal property entitlements aimed at reducing the likelihood of title uncertainty that causes buyers
to discount-by the probability that one's ownership in
property will be challenged and subsequently negated-the
price paid for property. As before, the identity of the ultimate owners of the property is relatively unimportant. 44
However, unlike the auction schemes motivated by global
wealth maximization, privatization aimed at realizing government revenue objectives need not be as concerned with the
limiting effect of prior endowments. After all, the object of
the exercise is to maximize the amount of revenue received
by the government, even if this precludes higher valued
users from entering the auction by reason of wealth constraints. The innate indifference of government revenue
driven privatization schemes to impecunious bidders is reinforced by the fact that rectification of these constraints is
likely to require some on~budget expenditures that will reduce the net revenues to be expected from the sale of state
assets.
This discussion evokes a more general point related to
sequencing which is that the more clearly established the
legal rules of market competition, the less uncertainty there
will be among private buyers, and the more they will be prepared to pay for assets. 45 Rules with respect to competition
policy, taxation, corporate transformations, environmental
protection, and occupational health and safety will have an
enormous impact on the future value of the assets in question. Under conditions of fundamental uncertainty about
the nature of these rules, it is not surprising that almost all
investors (except possibly high-risk investors) would either
make "low" bids or adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Of
44. However, if governments are concerned about improvements in
their foreign capital accounts, there may be a premium on selling to foreign rather than domestic owners.
45. For a discussion about this tension, see J. French Hill, Rebirth of a
Nation: The Difficulties in Eastern and Central Europe, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 345, 347 (1991). "The new democrats pass private property statutes,
declare and construct independent judiciaries, move to end central planning and price controls; but the old nomenklatura ask, 'who sells the property, decides the cases, plans the production, and sets the prices, if not a
ministry?'" /d.
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course, in any market economy, private economic actors face
the significant risk that future government action will affect
the value of their investments.46 However, the uncertainties
connected with a change in regime are of a different quantitative and qualitative order. Within that type of situation the
basic rules of the marketplace, social deals or social contracts, and political coalitions are in a constant state of flux.
In their discussion on the transition from authoritarian rule
in Latin America and Southern Europe, O'Donnell and
Schmitter noted that:
During these transitions and around many themes,
it is impossible to specify ex ante which classes, sectors, institutions, and other groups will take what
role, opt for which issues, or support what alternative. . . . Moreover, those actors are likely to undergo significant changes as they try to respond to
the changing contexts presented to them by liberalization and democratization.47
An alternative, of course, to postponing privatization
until some of this uncertainty has passed is to provide firmspecific guarantees concerning future regulatory conduct. In
market societies, it is quite frequent-where the future behavior of the seller can influence the value to the buyer of
the asset sold-to make covenants that restrain the future
conduct of the seller. A typical example of this are provisions that prevent the seller from competing with the buyer
for a certain period of time. In the context of regime transition, guarantees that are firm-specific raise special concerns.
Some provisions, such as those affecting the integrity of title,
however, are quite benign, and are entirely consistent with
privatization guided by wealth maximization:
On the other hand, as one moves along a continuum, it
is clear that some of the guarantees that governments may
offer to purchasers in order to increase the amount of proceeds generated by the sale of the asset may have quite a
46. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis ofLegal TrallS1t;01/S, 99 HAR\'.
L. REV. 509 (1986).
47. GUILLERMO A. O'DONNELL and PHIUPPE C. SCHMI'ITER, Tmtatlt't
Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies, in TRANSITIONS FROM AtmIORITARIAN RULE: PROSPEcrS FOR DEMOCRACY 4 (Guillenno A. O'Donnell el al.
eds., 1986).
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destructive impact on wealth maximization objectives. For
instance, assurances by the government that the purchaser
will be insulated from the impact of anti-competition legislation or that the purchaser will receive preferential treatment
from the government in procurement contracts will all work
to increase the amount purchasers will be willing to pay for
assets, but will also create a new set of special privileges that
distort competition and hence undermine wealth maximization objectives. 48
Thus, there appears to be a conflict between the wealth
maximization and revenue maximization perspectives. One
may well ask to what degree such guarantees are likely to
genuinely increase the purchase price. Given the uncertainty
about basic rules of the game, and the considerable instability in the political process, how will potential investors view
the likelihood of such commitments being honored in the
longer term? The guarantees in question may very well be
repudiated or modified, especially if viewed by successor
governments as unjustified special privileges or if considered
illegitimate in the public eye. When one considers the high
degree of political uncertainty at the present juncture, it is
probable that such guarantees will be significantly discounted by bidders in auctions.
While it is clearly undesirable that states in the NLCs
make assurances to prospective purchasers of enterprises
that are aimed at thwarting normal competitive pressures,
the case for making assurances that are aimed at relieving
enterprises of their traditional welfare responsibilities to employees and communities is stronger. This case is not based
on a belief that the costs of human misfortune arising, for
instance, from unemployment or illness, should be left to lie
where they falL Rather, the argument is that the state should
directly provide a basic social safety net, rather than imposing this requirement on enterprises. 49 This is so for several
reasons. First of all, the ability of an enterprise to meet its
social obligations depends upon its solvency. The early
48. George L. Priest, Will Argentina Replace One iHonopoly lVith Another?,
WALL ST.]., Sept. 22,1989, at A13.
49. See A. GELB & C. GRAY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF ECONOMIES IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: ISSUES, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS annex
6 at 53-55 (World Bank Policy and Research Series No. 17, 1991).
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stages of a market economy in the NLCs are likely to be characterized by a large number of enterprise failures and the
establishment of many new businesses that will, at the outset,
lack financial stability. This will, in turn, render an employer-based safety net highly tenuous for many workers. It
will also increase pressure on the state to impede the market
by not letting firms fail in order to protect the social entitlements of workers. Of course, one possible solution would be
for the state to back or guarantee the social obligations of
firms against the risk of insolvency. However, in this circumstance, unless the state was prepared to accept the full moral
hazard of such an insurance policy, it would want to control
the riskiness of firm conduct. This would then set the stage
for a new kind of interference in micro-economic behavior.
Secondly, under an employment-linked system of social protection, certain classes of particularly disadvantaged persons
are likely to "fall between the cracks"-unemployed youth,
the chronically ill, and the disabled: indeed anyone without
an entrenched position in an established enterprise. Ironically, some of the most disadvantaged groups end up being
the least protected.50 Thirdly, employment-based social welfare entitlements also raise problems for efficiency values.
With receipt of social welfare entitlements tethered to employment, labor mobility, an essential feature of a free market economy, will be undermined. Already, there is ample
evidence in the NLCs of a "lock-in" effect, whereby employees are reluctant to leave their existing jobs for better jobs
elsewhere in the country because of the fear of foregone welfare and pension benefits. 51 By shifting the provision of benefits from the enterprise to the state, the employment deci-

50. Indeed, this is an increasingly recognized problem with some West
European versions of the social welfare state that depend to a great extent
on the imposition of social obligations on enterprises. A growing underclass without long-term unionized employment in large firms or in government finds itself largely unprotected by the social welfare state.
5!. For a discussion of the myriad obligations of state aimed enterprise
to the community, see Peter Cook, Wallted: People to Take RfSPOllSlbilitJ.
GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 26, 1991. at B18 (citing the case of Huta Warzawa. a
Polish steel maker, which is required to fund the activities of a local hospital, housing estates, state farms, schools, and SP0rl teams, as well as its
workers' free lunches and holidays).

HeinOnline -- 25 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 49 1992-1993

Imaged with the Permission of N. y.u. Journal of Internationl Law and Politics

50

INTERNATIONAL LA W AND POLITICS

[Vol. 25:27

sion is isolated from the benefits decision, thereby commensurately enhancing labor mobility.
Given that assurances made during a period of regime
change carry a considerable risk of non-fulfillment, whatever
assurances are offered concerning the future rights and obligations of the enterprise, it is likely that significant discounting for uncertainty will nevertheless occur. From a revenue
maximization perspective, it might seem at first glance desirable for the government to refuse bids it perceives as too
low, in the hope that a higher bid will come along at a later
time. As noted above, however, the effect may be to put a
damper on bids, thereby decreasing the likelihood of sale altogether. Considerable delay has already occurred in the
privatization process out of fear that governments will somehow be cheated of revenue by buyers whose assets under
market conditions turn out to be far more valuable than predicted. A related fear is that some buyers may simply turn
around and liquidate the assets, thereby realizing revenues
greater than the sale price and at the same time imposing
considerable social costs on the state from worker dislocation. 52 In effect, the private buyer will be able to pocket any
upside gain from the sale, whereas the downside risk is still
likely to be borne, in one way or another, by the government.
There are several ways in which these concerns may be
addressed. First of all, the state can retain a certain amount
of equity in the enterprise, thereby sharing in some of the
future gains. Indeed, several privatization proposals do involve the state retaining some such interest in privatized enterprises. 53 Secondly, it is important to realize that, through
taxation of corporate income and capital gains, the government is going to gain in any case if large returns are realized
by enterprises. In other words, so long as a comprehensive
and effective tax structure is in place, governments can be
confident of sharing in any arbitrage profits that derive from
52. If the government wishes to create a disincentive to short-term liquidation of assets by new owners and instead encourage long-term restructuring, it can do so by imposing a form of speculation or turnover tax.
However, from a wealth maximization perspective, it may be undesirable
to discourage such activity, which does have the potential to rapidly reallocate assets to higher valued uses.
53. See, e.g., Lipton & Sachs, supra note 29.
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mistakes in the auction process. 54 Once the possibilities for
at least partial governmental recovery of profits "lost"
through fire sale prices are acknowledged, the reasonableness of forestalling privatization to protect government fiscal
objectives becomes deeply suspect. This is especially so
when one considers both the efficiency losses that are experienced when valuable resources are left to languish in the
hands of government and the external costs to the whole
transformation enterprise by slowing the transfer of power.
At the same time, it should be understood that purchasers of
state assets are taking high risks, and it is legitimate that
these risks be accompanied by the possibility of realizing
profits where an enterprise turns out to be highly valuable.
Punitive taxation of the gains from resale of state enterprises, or more generally, of capital gains, will only serve to
reinforce the prejudice ingrained under socialism that arbitrage profits constitute illegitimate "speculation." In fact,
such profits provide crucial incentives to reallocating resources to higher valued uses as well as stimulating investment in information that allows more accurate evaluation of
assets.55 In this connection, it is important to institute effective measures for tax compliance56 as well as to define and
identify fraudulent trade practices and to allay suspicions
that high profits are necessarily the product of fraudulent or
other inappropriate practices (e.g., abuse of insider information or corruption of government officials).
C. Decentralization and Fragmentatwn

of Political Power

A third role for privatization focuses on the political part
of the reform agenda for Central and Eastern Europe, and
envisages privatization as a vehicle for the decentralization
and fragmentation of political power. Specifically, by transferring property previously held under state stewardship to
domestic citizens, the power of citizens to check the concen54. See Charles E. McLure Jr., Income Tax PoliC)' for Refonnmg Sona/ut
Economies, 2 PARKER Sca. BULL. SOVIET & E. EUR. L., No....-Dec. 1991, at 6.
55. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, bifonnatiol/ and the Law
of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978).
56. In Poland, the failure of indi...iduals and companies to par their
taxes has been particularly acute. See Po/arid Loses Heart, ECONOMIST, Feb.
22, 1992, at 41.
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trated exercise of political authority is correspondingly enhanced. 57 Demonopolization of former governmental assets
promotes this objective by providing private citizens with independent sources of productive resources, which in turn
helps reduce the leverage available to governments or their
delegates through the control of productive resources within
the state. Once an individual knows that her assets are protected from unilateral and capricious control by governments, she will more confidently challenge governmental authority. These challenges may be expressed in as simple a
way as by providing financial contributions to opposition
political parties.
Aside from fragmenting concentrated political power by
empowering citizens, privatization will also remove the
state's power to reward and penalize citizens for loyalty or
disloyalty to an individual or idea. The legacy of communism in Central and Eastern Europe provides a poignant example of the various ways in which carrots and sticks, including educational opportunities, jobs, and preferential access
to scarce goods, were meted out in order to coerce commitments to ruling elites. The transfer of assets to the private
sector, especially when accompanied by the rise of private
markets, will make some of these perquisites (e.g., preferential access to scarce goods) valueless. While some types of
rewards (e.g., a lucrative job) will still be valuable in a privatized economy, a private sector dedicated to profit maximization will be disinclined to award these perquisites on political
grounds, as doing so will likely inflict unnecessary costs on
owners of the assets.
A privatization program oriented toward the implementation of political fragmentation goals requires considerable
sensitivity on the part of the state to the identity of the ultimate owners of distributed property. Instead of allocating
property to those individuals having either the greatest willingness (pursuant to wealth maximization) or ability (pursu57. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 9 (1982).
"Viewed as a means to the end of political freedom. economic arrangements are important because of their effect on the concentration or dispersion of power." /d. See also WALTER LIPPMANN. THE METHOD OF FREEDOM
100-02. 110-14 (1934); and Charles A. Reich. The New Properly, 73 YALE
LJ. 733 (1964).

HeinOnline -- 25 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 52 1992-1993

Imaged with the Permission of N. y.u. Journal of Internationl Law and Politics

1992]

REFORMING THE REFORM PROCESS

53

ant to government revenue maximization) to pay, this objective requires property to be distributed on criteria, such as
the Rawlsian difference principle, that are sensitive to disparities in the existing distribution of wealth. Such a program
would appear to provide a basic level of economic security
for all citizens. It will also vindicate autonomy concerns by
ensuring that all citizens enjoy the material wealth necessary
to support the basic conditions for individual action. It is
possible that under such a scheme certain political minority
groups that hitherto have been systematically excluded from
economic benefits will gain a disproportionate share of distributed resources. A possible further refinement of a
scheme motivated by political fragmentation goals would be
the imposition of restrictions on alienability of assets to ensure that the wealth represented by in species property entitlements remains with the original recipients of the property.
While privatization schemes motivated by government
revenue maximization goals are not inherently inimical to
global wealth maximization goals, the same cannot be said of
privatization schemes designed to vindicate political fragmentation objectives. This is because widespread economic
empowerment of citizens through privatization causes defacto
severance of ownership and control of assets, resulting in the
loss of economic wealth. This in turn enhances the prospect
ofvery severe agency problems. Such programs of "peoples'
capitalism" may also do little to distribute political and economic power. They merely shift power from one set of elites
(politicians) to another (unaccountable managers). While
one widely touted solution to the agency problems between
managers and investors involves the introduction of institutional intermediaries, the effect of this modification will be to
shift the agency problems back a level to intermediaries and
investors, while simultaneously creating new and powerful
foci of economic power in the institutional intermediaries. 58
Some of the difficulties in such privatization schemes
can be seen by a preliminary examination of recent Czechoslovak legislation that has implemented privatization
58. This scheme is associated with that proposed by Lipton & Sachs.
supra note 29, at 127-30, and has been implemented in Poland. Set John
Reed, Poland's First Candidntes fOT Mass Prit'atizatio71. Bus. E. EUR.• Dec. 2.
1991, at 440.
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through the sale of vouchers to the general public.59 The
legislation envisages that each citizen would have a right to
purchase a given quantity of vouchers for a set sum of one
thousand Crowns. 60 During each "round" of privatization,
shares of certain state enterprises would be offered for sale
in exchange for these vouchers. The rate of exchange between shares and vouchers for each enterprise would be determined by the government. 61 As an alternative to exchanging vouchers for shares in particular firms, vouchers
may be exchanged for shares in "investment funds" that
would in turn acquire a portfolio of shares of various privatized companies. 62 Where demand for shares of a particular
company, during a round, exceeded the supply, no shares of
that company would be sold. 63 Instead, the sale would be
postponed to the next round; however, the price of the
shares would be increased. 64 Where supply equalled or exceeded demand, all orders would be filled. The likely result
of this system is that in the initial round of privatization, the
investment funds would end up with large quantities of relatively unpopular shares (those for which all orders could be
filled), while the sale of companies that attracted strong investor interest would be postponed to later rounds. In effect, the investment funds would be starting off with portfolios consisting primarily of shares in the less saleable enterprises-a result hardly likely to inspire longer-term public
confidence in these funds.
While the participation of Czechoslovak citizens in the
sale and registration of the voucher books has been widespread (by the February 29, 1992 deadline for the sale of
voucher books, over 8.6 million had been issued),65 the actual process has been fraught with many shortcomings. A
serious concern is the system's lack of regulatory or remedial
59. Decree No. 383 of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic of
Sept. 5, 1991, on the Disbursement and Usage ofInvestment Vouchers, 73
Sbirka zakonu (Sept. 30, 1991) (translated by Ecoservice, Prague).
60. /d.
61. Id.
62.Id.
63.Id.
64.Id.
65. Peter Passell, A Capitalist Freejor-All in Czechoslovakia, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 12, 1992, § 3, at 10.
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structures, thereby creating the potential for serious abuses
both now and in the future. 66 Since the introduction of the
voucher privatization program, the failure of the Czechoslovak government to implement either a more functional disclosure system or a more stringent framework for investor
protection has been highlighted by the occurrence of a
number of incidents.
The lack of a comprehensive, functioning system of financial disclosure has hampered the voucher system from
the very beginning. Originally to be implemented on January I, 1992, the voucher plan was delayed in November 199 I
because there was no way for the government to accurately
assess the value of the assets it planned to sell at auction. 67
Although shares in these auctioned companies are being virtually "given away," it is imperative that the government
have a good indication of the share value if it is to accurately
establish their worth in terms of vouchers for the initial stock
offering. Likewise, the lack of an adequate method of disclosure makes purchasing shares a largely hit or miss proposition, thereby severely undermining novice investor confidence in the share ownership system. 68
In addition to these concerns, there is the risk that insider trading will proliferate due to the lack of an adequate
disclosure system. Without any sort of regulatory framework
to guide investors' actions, insider trading could prove to be
a very real problem for the fledgling markets of Czechoslovakia. 59 Lack of a regulatory system to govern movement of
shares created problems in Czechoslovakia even before the
voucher system became fully operational. The most significant problem to date has been caused by independently
formed investment companies buying up a large percentage
of the available voucher books; if a citizen wants to register a

66. Ivan Major, Why Eastern Europe Is Goillg Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
21, 1992, at A21.
67. Jari Kobylka, Privatizatioll Process Slows ill Cuchoslova/lia, Bus. E. EUR.,
Nov. 25, 1991, at 421.
68. In Poland, this problem has been addressed by making citizens on1>·
indirect shareholders-by way of holding companies-in the privatized en·
terprises.
69. Passell, supra note 65.
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voucher book, she must often turn to one of these funds. 70
One enterprising fund manager, by promising investors a
ten-fold return on their money within one year, has managed
to capture nearly twenty percent of all the voucher coupons
sold to date. 71
These kinds of actions present two problems to privatizing governments. First of all, there is the concern that ownership of industry will remain extremely concentrated since
it will simply pass from state ownership to a few vast monopolistic, and vertically integrated ownership structures, with
one form of economic domination being replaced by another. The second, and perhaps more tangible, fear is that
these investment funds do not have sufficient capital to even
remotely cover the guarantees that they are making to their
investors. Any kind of run on these funds would leave fund
managers struggling to raise capital to meet investor demands. 72 The only way to meet such demands would be for
the funds to quickly strip the companies they control of their
assets. While this would, in a sense, constitute the functioning of market forces, a purpose of the privatization program
is to place companies in the hands of investors who will make
t~em functional and not merely break them up and sell the
pIeces.
The efficiency losses from a privatization program inspired by political fragmentation may be especially great if
coupled with other features designed to reinforce the wealthcreating effects of the initial transfer of property. If, as expected, the ex post value of entitlements received by different
individuals differs (a probable outcome given heterogenous
bundles of initial entitlements), the state may be predisposed
to periodically readjust entitlements, thereby ensuring formal equality. Predictably, such interventions and their accompanying uncertainty do considerable violence to the in70. Czechs by Millions Invest $35 in Big State Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
1992, at A7.
71. John Tagliabue, Hot to Invest? Trost a Man with a Harvard Past?, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 1991, at A4. As of May 19, 1992, over four hundred mutual funds had been set up in Czechoslovakia. These funds had acquired
approximately 55% of the voucher points issued prior to the initial sale of
state owned enterprises. Roger Cohen, Czechoslovakia a Bull i'tlarket as State
Grip Yields to Stock, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1992, at AI.
72. Passell, supra note 65.
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tegrity of property entitlements required for private economic planning, and further threaten to reintroduce the
specter of unwarranted state intervention in citizens' lives.
These interventions thus effectively impair both wealth maximization and political fragmentation objectives. Similarly, if
the government decides to introduce restrictions on share
alienability so as to maintain widely dispersed share ownership, the emergence of active capital markets will be
thwarted. Even more seriously, higher valued users of property will be precluded from gaining control of the assets
through subsequent disposition.
Privatization programs aimed at power decentralization
will also collide with privatization programs designed to generate government revenue. Whereas the former may require
the giving away of assets directly to the least advantaged
without any requisite payment, the latter are premised on the
assumption that assets should be sold to the most affluent
citizens who have the greatest ability to pay. These latter
programs would thus systematically exclude the least materially advantaged from property ownership.
It may be quite dangerous to view dispersal of state industrial assets among the population at large (through
vouchers or any other system) as an appropriate means of
citizen empowerment. First of all, such entitlements are
highly unlikely to lead to economic security, at least in the
short run. Even if citizens are given shares or vouchers to
trade for shares in a mutual fund containing a fairly wide selection of companies, as some of the more sophisticated proposals advocate, the security of the entitlement will depend
upon the quality of fund management. Inadequate information regarding the value of assets under market conditions,
at least in the near future, will likely lead to trading decisions
based primarily on speculation and rumor. Some proposals,
however, envisage that the funds would not engage in active
trading in the short term, i.e., they would hold shares of a
fixed group of companies, and have some role in supervising
those companies' management. 7S From a wealth maximiza73. BLANCHARD ET AL., supra note 25, at 31-42; Roman Frydman &
Andrzej Rapaczynski, Markets & Institutions in Large Scale Prh'atizations
(Working Paper no. 49, in the Center for Law and Economic Studies, Columbia University School of Law at 7, 25-37); Andrzej Rapaczynski & Ro-
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tion perspective, this stability would be bought at the price
of severe restrictions on the market's ability to reallocate
capital.
In order for equity holdings to constitute the economic
security of the ordinary citizen-although such holdings do
not generally constitute the ordinary person's main form of
economic security, except perhaps in the United States-extraordinary protections are required against abuse, corruption, and instability. To adequately protect the interests of
small investors who have little independent capacity to monitor the market or the activities of management, while at the
same time allowing the market sufficient freedom to do its
work, requires a very carefully crafted regime of securities
and corporate law regulation. Striking this balance at the initiation of market activity, in an environment of fundamental
uncertainty about values and in the absence of sophisticated
professional analysis, is likely to be impossible. There exists
a very real risk that early instances of abuse or even high volatility that negatively affect the economic security of ordinary
people will lead to irresistible demands for a clampdown on
market activity that may perhaps extend well beyond capital
markets.
In addition to the rationale for a move toward decentralization, distribution of shares to the population at large has
been advocated based on the premise that it is the people at
large who now actually "own" the assets, and who should
benefit from the assets in the future. 74 This argument seems
to have been derived from the nature of equity ownershipsuch ownership is not really ownership in a fixed stock of

s

man Frydman, The Polish Government Large-Scale Privatization Plan: A Preliminary Analysis, 2 PARKER SCH. BULL. SOVIET & E. EUR. L., Feb. 1991, at 12, 11; Kaj Hober, The New October Revolution: Launching the Russian Privatization Program, 3 PARKER SCH. BULL. SOVIET & E. EUR. L., Oct. 1992, at 10·11;
and Vratislav Pechota, Czechoslovak Privatization: An Intennezzo, 1 PARKER
SCH. BULL. SOVIET & E. EUR. L., Jan. 1991, at 10.
74. In many cases, workers wonder what the fuss is about, because of course they own the firms. And communist managers in
many firms have simply assumed the right to trade, lease, merge,
or even sell the enterprise assets, often for their own enrichment
and to the fury of the public.
Lipton & Sachs, supra note 29, at 128. See also Hober, supra note 73, at 2,
10 (discussing the conceptual problem of determining who owns the state
enterprises).
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wealth, but rather an entitlement to a portion of a future
earnings stream. 75 In selling enterprises. the state need not
be viewed as having abandoned its claim on their future
earnings stream, but rather the claim now involves the taxation of profits. As such, the state is rendered a contingent
claimant of sorts on the firm's income stream, sharing in
both the profits and losses of a given enterprise. Under
these terms, once a comprehensive and effective tax system
is put into place, governments will be able to raise capital for
a variety of social programs, enabling them to more accurately target a given set of recipients so as to vindicate substantive rather than merely formal notions of equality. Of
course, given the anti-statist thrust of decentralization arguments for privatization. this course would be undesirable
since the state is the necessary intermediary in the redistribution of wealth from private economic activity.
In this context, it would be very naive to regard equity
holdings as a kind of absolute property entitlement that the
state cannot affect so long as it respects the rule oflaw. It is
well known to those familiar with advanced capitalism that
the state plays a vital role in making and enforcing the rules
for markets in equity. thereby ensuring fairness and stability.
In the absence of competent, impartial, and non-corrupt regulators, having the power to enforce good legislation. abuses
of private power are as likely to jeopardize the economic security of citizens as abuses of public power did in the past.
Faith in the market is not a substitute for, but rather depends
upon, faith in the state. The reform process as it now stands
requires a greater focus on reforming public administration
by training regulatory officials and implementing measures
designed to create credible and competent public institutions. 76 In focusing on the purported advantages of privatization as a means of ending state involvement in economic
life, many commentators unfortunately have diverted atten75. Of course, there is a sense in which equity ownership is a claim on
fixed wealth. Typically, shareholders have a residual claim on assets at
liquidation or break-up; however, this claim is subordinate to the claims of
the firm's employees and other creditors.
76. Eberstadt suggests that the rectification of institutional maladjustments-to protect individual rights and enforce private contracts-is one
of the largest obstacles to privatization. Nicholas N. Eberstadt, How Xot to
Aid Eastern Europe, COMMENTARY 92(5) (November 1991).
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tion from the need to build strong states in the NLCs, and
have simply focused on one narrow version of liberalism:
the idea that freedom is dependent upon less government. 77
These commentators have ignored the philosophy underlying the success of contemporary liberal and social democracies, namely, that freedom requires a strong but limited government.

Compensatory Justice
In this section, we consider issues of compensatory justice in the privatization settings of reprivatization and market
transitions.
D.

1. Reprivatization
One of the rationales for privatization in Central and
Eastern European states is the need to rehabilitate the legitimacy of the state by compensating citizens for wrongs suffered under their predecessor communist regimes. 78 Usually, this compensation has taken the form of restoration of
wrongfully seized property, but sometimes a monetary
equivalent is offered instead. Broadly stated, the purpose of
reprivatization is to rehabilitate respect for the state and the
rule of law by celebrating the cherished values of personhood and peoplehood that lie at the core of civilized society. It is thus ironic that an enterprise so filled with noble
aspirations has become the achilles heel of privatization in
the NLCs.79 The difficulties with reprivatization can be
found at several different levels, ranging from a core conceptual disagreement about the content of compensatory justice
to problems of determining eligibility for compensation, and
the compatibility of compensatory justice with other privatization goals.
77. See NICHOLAS EBERSTADT, THE POVERlY OF COMMUNISM (1988).
78. Czechs to Return Seized Property, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1991, at AlO;
Stefan Eder, Restitution and Privatization in Czechoslovakia, 6 BUTrERWORTHS
J. INT'L BANKING AND FINANCIAL L., May 1991, at 241; Ethan Klingsberg,
Hungary: the Constitutional Politics of Compensation, 2 PARKER SCH. BULL. SoVIET & E. EUR. L.,June 1991, at 1.
79. For a discussion of the problems of reprivatization in the Czechoslovakian context, see Vratislav Pechota, Privatization and Foreign /nvt'st/1/t'Ilt
in Czechoslovakia: The Legal Dimension, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305, 309
(1991).
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In contrast to the relatively clear set of principles that
supports privatization's other objectives, compensatory justice is much more difficult to define as a determinate goal. In
large part, this reflects the complex relationship between the
principles of corrective and distributive justice that are inherent in any compensatory justice scheme. so The principle
of correctivejustice can be traced to Aristotle, and is invoked
to redress harms inflicted on the innocent.sl Corrective justice requires that the value of ill-gotten gains be transferred
from the 'wrongdoer to the victim. In determining the magnitude of redress, corrective justice looks only to the gains
which were wrongfully appropriated from the victim, and is
blind to the relative merits, wealth, or virtue of either the
wrongdoer or the victim.
In the context of privatization in the NLCs, the tension
between corrective and distributive justice is evidenced by
the competing claims of those individuals whose injury does
and those whose injury does not reflect some tangible act or
decision undertaken by a predecessor communist regime.
An example of the former would be the harm suffered by an
individual citizen as a result of the nationalization of her
house and shop. This injury would substantiate a claim for
corrective justice. On the other hand, those citizens who
were not property owners prior to communist revolutions
may still have a claim to compensation that sounds in distributive justice. This claim may be based on some systematic
discrimination or exclusion that pre-dates the change in government. The fact that some intervening event (e.g., a communist revolution) has occurred, which has deprived other
wealthier citizens of their property, may not be sufficient to
extinguish the original claim.
Assuming that the tension between distributive and corrective justice can be resolved, perhaps by vindicating only
corrective justice objectives through a reprivatization
scheme, the question then becomes one of eligibility. That
is, who will be entitled to benefit from corrective justice?
80. See Robert E. Goodin, Compensation and Redistnbutioll, '" COMPENSATORY JUSTICE 143 Gohn W. Chapman ed., 1991).
81. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS (T.E. Pagc ct al. cds., 2nd cd••
1926). See also, Ernest Weinrib, Aristotle's Fonns ofjust/ct, 111 JUSTICE, LAw
AND METHOD IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 133 (Spiro Panagiolou cd., 1987).
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For which acts? Who will supply the benefits? And to what
extent? These questions pose difficult, almost intractable
challenges to privatization architects. In contrast with the
relatively straightforward case where one individual harms
another, compensatory justice implemented on a national
scale requires collectivization of both responsibility for harm
and entitlement to redress. The move from individual to
collective responsibility is, however, extremely controversia1. 82 To a large extent, opposition to collectivization reflects the difficulty in identifying discrete groups of perpetrators and victims. However, where a political majority perpetrates injustice against a discrete minority (the case of
interned Japanese-Canadians and Americans, or Jewish victims of Nazi Germany), it is possible to identify the specific
groups of perpetrators and victims, and thereby assign collective responsibility. As a result, determinations as to compensation are simplified.
In the case of reprivatization proposals in Central and
Eastern Europe, however, even progressing this far is a virtually impossible task. Vaclav Havel, in one of the most persuasive and sophisticated analyses of the nature of totalitarianism in Central and Eastern Europe, has presented a picture of a system in which nearly every citizen in some
significant sense was both a victim and a perpetrator of the
injustices of totalitarianism. 83 At the extreme, many dissidents were also police informers, and many of those who
lived by totalitarian terror died by it as well. In these circumstances, singling out those who have suffered confiscation of
property as the relevant set of victims becomes highly problematic. Compensating these individuals with public revenues that are needed for society at large seems morally problematic, especially in the absence of a legally coherent program designed to reclaim the wealth accumulated by certain
individuals under the old system. This problem is further
complicated where the state lacks a comparable system for

82. For some of the difficulties of collectivizing corrective justice, sec
James S. Fishkin,Justice Between Generations: Compensation, Identity, and Group
Membership, in COMPENSATORY JUSTICE, supra note 80, at 85.
83. Vaclav Havel, The Power of the Powerless, in LIVING IN TRUTH 40-57
Uan Vladislav ed. & Paul Wilson trans., 1986).
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compensating the victims of other forms of injustice such as
torture, imprisonment, and suppression of free speech.
Further compounding these difficulties is the perplexing
question of what date to set as the cut-off for compensation
claims. By restoring property to previous owners, reprivatization implicitly endorses the distribution that existed as of
the cut-off date. However, given the history of the Eastern
and Central European region in the twentieth century, the
selection of any such date would cause problems. Thus, determining a generally acceptable cut-off date becomes an impossible task, because in the absence of a coherent justification for the initial acquisition of property, virtually any distribution of property may be questioned. 84
The difficulties inherent in the identification of a cut-off
date are sharply illustrated in the Czechoslovak reprivatization scheme. In determining the potential beneficiaries of
compensation, the state debated several different cut-off
dates-the further back in time the state went, the broader
the class of persons to whom the state was providing redress.
By selecting 1946 as a floor for recovery, the state implicitly
denied rights of recovery of property to Czechoslovakian
Jews whose property was taken by the Nazis in 1939 and to
other citizens whose property was "invited" to be donated to
the state during the short lived coalition government that existed between 1945 and 1946. By compensating or returning
property to individuals who themselves may have acquired it
against a background of illegitimacy or injustice, the state violates its OVID principle concerning the purification of title.
These concerns are far from hypothetical. In a recent
ruling, the Hungarian Constitutional Court struck down a
reprivatization law on the grounds, inter alia, that it did not
state a rational basis consistent with the Constitution for
compensating only those whose property had been taken after 1949 (the Communist revolution), while leaving confiscations from the Jewish minority in 1939 and the German minority in 1944 uncompensated. 85 Following this ruling the
government submitted a proposal for the enactment of a
compensation law encompassing the period from May I,
84. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 150-53 (1974).
85. Klingsberg, supra note 78. at 1-2 (describing The Compmsalloll CAst
III (Decision 2811991 (Vl.3) AB».
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1939 to June 8, 1949, and establishing a maximum compensation level for this period of US$64,OOO.86
Eligibility problems are but one example of the very serious dangers lurking within any reprivatization scheme.
Although the policy is designed to restore respect for the
rule of law, the very contentious line-drawing exercises,
which are often motivated more by pragmatism than principle, are sure to subvert that enterprise. Rather than remaining an exercise based on objective, dispassionate principles,
reprivatization has become a policy rooted firmly in caprice
and wedded intimately to narrow interest group politics.
Perhaps the most discouraging part of reprivatization is
the considerable cost imposed on the other vaunted goals of
privatization. At the most basic level, reprivatization requires a fairly elaborate administrative structure in order to
deal with the myriad claims for return of previously owned
property. Against established criteria, every claim for return
of property will have to be processed and assessed by a central agency. Where there is more than one claim to a single
property, the agency will have to determine whose claim is
valid. In the event that there are multiple, equally valid
claims to the property in question, the agency will have to
determine how the claims can be reconciled with one another. Of course, in order to bolster the legitimacy of the
process, it will be necessary to include some right of review,
either to an independent agency or the judiciary.87
Strictly in terms of the funds necessary to establish and
operate an apparatus along the lines contemplated above,
reprivatization is likely to be an extremely costly enterprise.
However, confining one's attention to budgeted expenditures grossly understates the real costs of reprivatization.
Additional societal costs will be generated by the plethora of
private actors whose energies will be consumed by the process. Already there is strong evidence that many of the best
educated and most sophisticated professionals (e.g., lawyers
86. Bela Papp, The Business Outlook: Hungary, Bus. E. EUR., Jan. 27,
1992, at 41.
87. The more onerous the requirements of procedural fairness attached to these determinations the greater the danger of a dispute if the
property is returned quickly to someone in the private sector, thereby deterring long-term investments in property rehabilitation.
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and accountants) are focusing their energies on reprivatization. It is very striking, in view of the many perplexing and
difficult transition issues confronting the NLCs and their
ovenvhelming scarcity of human capital, that the very best
people in the NLCs find themselves mired in the essentially
backward-looking enterprise of reprivatization. Rather than
entangling themselves in the task ofsorting through the rubble of conflicting claims to property, it would make far more
sense for these individuals to direct their skills and expertise
toward other public services. Their talents can be used to
counteract the drag placed on the reform process by the remaining old guard bureaucrats.
Apart from the out-of-pocket costs, the most serious
costs of reprivatization are caused by the delays and uncertainty created by the administrative review of competing title
claims. For example, in the case oflands expropriated by the
former East German government, it is estimated that it will
take more than forty years to settle all of the filed claims.88
Indeed, in what was formerly East Germany, more than one
third of the total land mass will be affected by reprivatization. 89 In Potsdam alone, more than six thousand claims for
property have been filed, representing more than 85% of the
property in the downtown core.90 Clearly, with title to property subject to so much uncertainty, the efficiency goal
achieved by moving properties quickly to their highest valued uses will be seriously undermined. Moreover, even after
this property is transferred, it is unlikely that the beneficiary
will be the highest valued present day user of the property,
thereby necessitating a further transfer.
Unfortunately, despite these complications, it seems inevitable that restoration or compensation for confiscated
property will proceed in some form. 91 If that is the outcome,
88. Katie Hafner, The House H't! Lived In, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, § 6
(Magazine), at 32.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. In this vein, KORNAI, supra note 23, at 46, has argued that the restoration of property should not be a "number one priorit}'" of the reform
enterprise. For Kornai, the most important thing is "to declare in a trustworthy manner that there will never again be another confiscation." Id.
However, Kornai would allow return of lands to the peasanU)', although
he does not explain why he would carve out this exception. Id.
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the programs devised should be responsive to certain concerns. First, in order to ensure that these programs support
rather than detract from the rule of law, they should be sensitive to the wide range of harms suffered by citizens in the
NLCs. Elevating the unjustified takings of property to a position of singular importance makes a mockery of the law and
is bound to bring the entire process into disrepute.
Breaches by the NLCs of their obligations under such international treaties and covenants as the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights 92 may serve as the basis for supporting
such compensation. Second, while recognizing that infinite
retrospective rectification of previous unjust acquisitions of
property should be avoided, it seems sensible that the cut-off
date for claims be pushed back to include unjustified takings
of property during the inter-war years. 93 The rationale for
selecting this time period is based on the fact that many of
the NLCs first emerged as modern states during this period.
Thus, there is some continuity between the past and the
present political units. 94 Third, one way to lessen the deleterious impact of a reprivatization program is to sever the connection between the recognition of past wrongs and the actual restoration of in species property. This severance could
be achieved by adopting a program similar to the reparations
schemes used to compensate Jewish victims of Nazi Germany, and Japanese internees in the United States and Canada. Such a program would ensure that compensation objectives are not detrimental to wealth maximization goals.

2.

Compensation for Entitlements Disrupted by the Transition to a
Market Economy
The mirror image of the reprivatization issue is the issue

92. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/81O, at 71 (1948).
93. The proposed Hungarian Compensation Law for the period of May
I, 1939 to June 8, 1949 is limited to those losses falling within Hungarian
territory as defined by its post-World War II borders. See Karoly Okolicsonyi, Hungarian Compensation Law Proposal Covering the 1939-1949 Period,
PARKER SCH. SURV. E. EUR. L., March 1992, at 5.
94. Successor liability in international law is discussed by Taracouzio in
terms of the degree to which fundamental revolutionary changes in the
political organization of a state mitigate against the enforcement of certain, pre-existing obligations. TIMOTHY A. TARACOUZIO, THE SOVIET
UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 235-90 (1935).
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of compensation for disruption of entitlements such as employment, security, and housing that were established under
the previous regime. One approach to this issue would be to
consider these entitlements as no longer enforceable since
they were the product of a previous unjust order. There is
also a line of argument that one often hears in Western neoconservative circles, namely that now that people in Central
and Eastern Europe have chosen capitalism they must be
prepared to suffer the pain of market dislocations.95
Both these perspectives are largely erroneous. With respect to the first approach, it derives from the context in
which the social deals or contracts were originally made.
These contracts, however, already reflect somewhat of a
transitional order, particularly in the case of Hungary and
Poland. Mter the Czechoslovak revolution of 1968, a conscious decision was made in both Hungary and Poland to
base their citizens' obligations to the state less upon the ideological utruth" of communism, and more upon the state's
capacity to offer stable employment, social benefits (albeit
not of very high quality), and increased prosperity.96 Citizens traded political and economic freedom for a modicum
of security and comfort. Minimal demands were placed on
workers, and in return they accepted minimal compensation. 97 Long before the revolutions of 1990, the legitimacy
of the state in Hungary, Poland, and even Czechoslovakia depended upon their abilities to keep their end of this bargain
rather than upon Stalinist terror or ideological fanaticism.
Many people joined in the 1989-90 revolution because they
saw that sacrificing freedom for comfort was an inequitable
bargain. Others did so because the state had increasingly
become incapable of keeping its part of the bargain, or because they saw in the example of modem social welfare
states a model that did not seem to require those trade-offs.
In the privatization process, proposals that give workers
and managers a portion of shares in newly privatized enterprises for free or at a reduced cost imply a right to be compensated for disruption of previous claims or entitlements

23

95. Eberstadt, supra note 76, at 24; Charles Wolf, Jr., Gmmg 10 .\/arktl,
NAT'L INTEREST 43 (1991).
96. See Havel, supra note 83; see also Batt, supra note 20.
97. See Havel, supra note 83; see also Batt, supra note 20.
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with respect to the enterprise. However, the current "compensation," which may amount to little more than a worthless share of a worthless company, may be a poor substitute
for the previous social contract that offered employment security through the enterprise. One saving grace is that the
value of the enterprise will be directly related to its performance under market conditions rather than to the performance of the workers and managers according to some other
form of measurement.
Alternatively, allowing workers' councils or managers to
block or delay privatization of particular enterprises is undesirable from both wealth maximization and corrective justice
perspectives. According to the former standpoint, the delay
in reallocating resources on a market basis would be very
costly, and there is the prospect that workers and managers
would use their blocking power to secure from the employer
various guarantees, such as employment security and wage
levels, thereby making future reallocation of productive resources much more difficult. 98 From a corrective justice perspective, the right to block allows workers and managers to
hold out for whatever compensation they deem sufficient.
However, a corrective justice perspective based upon legitimate expectations would suggest that compensation be
based on normative criteria related to the nature of the expectation interests held by specific claimants to the entitlements in question.
More concretely, the disruption of entitlements under
the old order has different implications for different classes
of workers. Middle-aged or older workers with few transferable skills who have personal attachments to particular communities will clearly suffer considerable losses from the disruption of entitlements. Moreover, they will likely have limited opportunity to reap many of the benefits of a transition
to markets. Younger workers and managers, meanwhile, will
bear short-term or medium-term losses and risks as a consequence of the disruption of entitlements. However, that disruption will itself be intimately linked to the release of a wide
range of new opportunities. This insight has, we believe,
very important consequences for sequencing. Demands for
compensation due to the disruption of old entitlements will
98. Lipton & Sachs, supra note 22, at 298-99.
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be of far greater moral and political salience at early stages
in the transition process when new opportunities that arise
from transition are scarcer and more uncertain. Large-scale
privatization, involving a massive disruption of former entitlements, is likely to raise fewer obstructive corrective justice
issues once a much larger and clearer range of new opportunities is available to workers who are encumbered by the disruption. This is not simply a political insight but is quite
consistent with the correctivejustice theory's rejection of unjust enrichment. Once it is understood that the disruption of
entitlements through privatization is not a discrete state act
within stable rules of the game, but rather is part of an alteration of the rules that opens up opportunities as well as creates costs for all those affected, the principle of unjust enrichment will kick in to insure that compensation is net of
any new benefits or opportunities provided by the transition.
As long as costs are real and immediate, and benefits are
largely hypothetical and prospective, the compensation
problem may well prove intractable. However, the picture is
in many respects far from bleak. Liberalization of private
economic activity has itself resulted in a burst of new opportunities, reflected in the burgeoning of small businesses, especially in the service industries, in a number of Central and
East European countries. A graduated privatization program that balances worker dislocation with the emergence of
new opportunities, and which involves extensive job search
and retraining services may, from this perspective, prove to
be a more workable solution.99 Moreover, it is likely that
workers and managers will attempt to hold on to old entitlements to a much greater extent in the presence of considerable uncertainty about the content of the new social contract.
Some commentators see the privatization process as privatizing the question of the new social contract, which will
emerge out of market relations. This is fundamentally
wrong. The way in which workers view the attractiveness of
market relations will depend, to a significant extent, upon
various factors, such as the broad guarantees against high
unemployment that are implicit in the overall government
policy, and the type and extent of wage protections. In other
words, the issue of the attractiveness of market relations de99. See

BLANCHARD ET AL.,

supra note 25, at 90.

HeinOnline -- 25 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 69 1992-1993

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Internationl Law and Politics

70

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 25:27

pends on whether a Keynesian or some other kind of social
deal exists between capital markets, labor, and the state.
Privatization is thus not a substitute for the state having to
face the broad social and economic claims of workers. On
the contrary, until those claims are fixed in a new social contract, there will be very powerful incentives for many groups
to hold on to some commitments from the old contract.
This is why proposals aimed at very rapid privatization are
generally inoperable. Since it is difficult to craft a proposal
acceptable to those with strong interests to protect, the rapid
approach is less likely to inspire confidence in the transition
to a market economy than undertaking a gradualist approach
that marches in step with other reforms that clarify the rights
and obligations of labor, capital, and the state under market
conditions.
III.

CONCLUSION

As the twentieth century draws to a close, the liberalization of Central and Eastern European societies is an immense and complex challenge that confronts the world community. A core component in the revitalization of the NLCs
is the creation of social contracts that fundamentally realign
the relationship between those who govern and those who
are governed. Such understandings are crucial in order to
effectuate a workable privatization policy.
In considering the content of these contracts, Western
analysts should recognize the powerful appeal that the social
welfare state has in these settings. History has revealed that
these arrangements are remarkable for their power to offer
citizens hitherto unimagined levels of prosperity and freedom within the embrace of a compassionate state. Nevertheless, given the considerable economic surplus necessary to
fund the ambitious redistributive goals of the social welfare
state, the daunting challenge for the West is to determine
whether and how NLCs will be able to create such a state
despite their current lack of, or limited access to, economic
resources. An unacceptable solution will be to delay construction of a social welfare state until such time that it can
be funded by the citizenry. Given the high level of
destabilization that has arisen, and will continue to arise during the transition from communist to liberal market based
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societies, delay will ultimately lead to failure. In this respect,
continued Western assistance, both financial and intellectual,
is critical to the success of the privatization enterprise. The
West should not view its necessary financial assistance in
terms of traditional developmental aid-investments in
large-scale projects that have tended only to distort the market-allocation process-but rather in terms of a subsidy to
help pay for the transitional costs, such as those connected
with labor adjustment, and with the social safety net, which
are necessary for a shift to a market economy. With respect
to technical assistance and advice, theoretica1lessons on the
functioning of the markets and the formal training of manager-entrepreneurs may ultimately be of secondary importance. Far more crucial at the present juncture is an understanding of how governments can cope with the dislocation
costs involved in the transition to a market economy, and the
various normative claims and asserted interests of stakeholders, without jeopardizing political stability, social order, or
the definite commitment to the market system. How the
West responds to these challenges will say as much about its
core values and aspirations as it will those of the East.
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